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Abstract
Expert reviews are one of the possible methods for the assessment of controllability of advanced driver assistance systems 
(ADAS). This article presents the method of a study on the properties of expert reviews of controllability and reports the most 
important findings. For the study the criticality ratings and self assessed confidence ratings of a sample of 15 experts in 
controllability assessment were compared with the judgments of 49 naïve test subjects in a driving simulator setting in 7 distinct 
scenarios of partially automated driving. The results of this study give insight on the retest reliability of the expert rating and 
provide findings on the self assessed confidence of judgment in naïve and expert participants.
© 2015 The Authors.Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
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1. Introduction
With the aim of increasing driver comfort while reducing the number and severity of accidents in traffic the 
quantity and complexity of advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) available in passenger vehicles has been 
rising in the last decades. Modern assistance systems are advancing from warning or informing systems towards an 
active role in the longitudinal and lateral vehicle control with temporary or continuous intervention on the vehicle 
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dynamics. With ADAS such as traffic jam assist or park assist partially automated driving is a reality already. 
Complex assistance systems like these raise relevant concerns of controllability at the system limits as well as in 
case of failure. This is especially true when different assistance systems interact with one another.
The RESPONSE3 Code of Practice has been established with the goal of identifying a best practice for the 
assessment of controllability of advanced driver assistance systems[1]. Two of the specified methods are real and 
simulated driving based naïve test subject studies. With the rising number of ADAS in development and the 
simultaneously rising complexity of the concerns about the controllability of these systems test subject studies are 
becoming a more and more laborious section in the ADAS development process. It is likely that this trend will 
continue in the future. Alternative methods of controllability assessment are thus of considerable interest.
In the same document expert reviews have been defined as one of the methods to assess the controllability of 
ADAS. However little effort has been taken to define a framework on how such expert reviews must be conducted 
to guarantee a correct or at least conservative classification of the use-cases under investigation. This paper is 
looking to identify parameters of expert judgment in controllability under the assumptions of the RESPONSE3 Code 
of Practice.
This article describes a simulator-study performed using a static simulator of the BMW Group that aims to 
provide insight into the quality of expert panels on the controllability of driver assistance systems conducted in a 
simulated driving environment.
2. Theory
Expert judgment has been used in other areas of interest before. Examples are nuclear safety[2], biological 
safety[3], aviation [4], and economics[5]. Expert reviews are commonly used when a large or unknown number of 
factors influence the parameter of interest in a non-trivial manner or when the subject of interest is not available for 
study, e.g. due to safety concerns or financial feasibility. In the absence of other methods of study expert reviews 
can provide answers where otherwise no assertion can be made.
The suitability of expert judgment for health and safety relevant decisions has been under discussion ever since 
the observation of cognitive biases[6]. It has been shown that high expertise does not protect against the effects of 
cognitive biases [7]and that debiasing techniques are of limited use[8]. Intuitive judgments have been found to be 
negatively affected by overconfidence[9]. On the other hand certain fields have been identified in which expert 
judgment can be of great value[10]. In summary, it is necessary to inspect the performance of expert judgment in a 
field closely in order to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages carefully[11].
The debate on the suitability of expert reviews can be resolved based on the properties of the field in which it is 
conducted. While the nature of human expertise in judgment tasks is difficult to explain it is certain that in order to 
improve performance on a judgment task feedback about prior performance is a key requirement[12]. This at least 
partly explains why in some tasks expertise has a strong effect while in other areas experts can’t outperform even 
simple linear algorithms. In the field of controllability such feedback on performance is extremely difficult to come 
by. The development of ADAS can take years and the real-world results of the judgment of controllability for 
specific use-cases are often only available several years after the system has been introduced, if they are actually 
identified. This unavailability of feedback means that the quality of expert judgment in controllability can’t be 
assumed and should be studied in detail. 
This article focuses on the study of relative expertise in contrast to absolute expertise. Absolute experts are the 
selected few that define the best achievable performance at a given task at the current time. A requirement for being
an absolute expert is to be measurably superior at the studied task than other professionals in the domain. On the 
other hand relative experts are defined as having more expertise in the domain of interest than a chosen group of 
reference[13]. In the interest of generating findings that are suitable for practical application this article will focus on 
the study of relative experts, as these are more likely to be available when looking to assess the controllability of 
ADAS.
As mentioned earlier a well-defined method for the assessment of controllability specified in the RESPONSE3 
Code of Practice is the naïve test subject study. Due to reasons of practicality these are typically used to test whether 
85% or more percent of the drivers will be able to avert danger to themselves or others in the situation of interest. 
The test itself is set up as a number of binary fail-criteria that can be objectively determined to have been passed or 
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Fig.1. English adaption of the scale of disturbance[15].
failed based on the measurement data from either a real vehicle or a simulator. This setup is unsuitable for the study 
of experts for several reasons. It will generally be difficult to identify 20 experts in a field with a suitable amount of 
expertise. Furthermore the driving behavior of experts will be difficult to interpret due to the likely experience of 
advanced driver trainings. An alternative method of eliciting judgments on the criticality of driving scenarios that 
allows the participant to identify inacceptable danger without having violated the objective fail criteria would thus 
be advantageous.The scale of criticality [14]fulfills this criterion and has successfully been applied to studies of 
controllability. Judgments on this scale can be cast by naïve and expert participants and are thus a suitable basis of 
comparison. The scale’s approximate interval characteristic has the added benefit of allowing the evaluation of the 
difference between judgments.
In an earlier study [16]a large variance in the judgment of experts on the criticality of driving situations in a 
simulator was identified. There are several possible explanations for this. Obviously the level of expertise of the 
expert group could be too low to have a measurable effect on variance. On the other hand a significant effect on the 
level of judgments was identified. There is no obvious explanation as to why there should be an effect on the level 
of judgments but not on the variance of judgments. One alternative explanation is that it is difficult to find a 
common interpretation of the used scale when the participants are interviewed separately. In this case the lack of 
alternative opinion during the judgment process would lead to exaggerated confidence and thus more extreme 
judgments. Low confidence due to the availability of conflicting information would then be expected to cause more 
homogenous ratings. This reasoning should affect participants regardless of their level of expertise.
Gaining precise knowledge about a question that is otherwise difficult or impossible to answer is one major 
reason to employ expert panels. If this is not possible it would be preferable to diagnose this lack of information. 
Due to the limited number of judgments in an expert panel variance is not a suitable measure of uncertainty. This is 
because the inability to agree is not always identical with inability to judge properly. It would thus be preferable to 
directly elicit the certainty of the judgments cast by the experts. Earlier research has however shown that judgments 
of confidence exhibit significant overconfidence[17].There are several reasons for this effect in expert reviews.One 
of them is that, when eliciting judgments from experts individually, conflicting information is seldom presented. The 
lack of availability of other opinions leads to an overestimation of confidence. In this case the overconfidence is 
related to the availability bias[6]. To estimate the suitability of expert panels in controllability it would be 
advantageous to examine this effect of availability of information on overconfidence with a sample of experts 
recruited to the standards of the RESPONSE3 Code of Practice. 
Beside low variance and correct calibration another important aspect of good expert judgment is reliability. One 
way of measuring this is test-retest reliability. It would be assumed that good experts will cast similar judgments on 
identical driving situations on different occasions.
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Fig.2. The static vehicle simulator at the BMW FIZ.
3. Method
One of the goals of this study is to compare the properties of expert judgment with that of naïve test subjects. 
Therefore it was decided to perform the study in a simulated driving environment. Compared to text based studies 
this requires a lower level of abstraction and compared to real driving scenarios the scope of the trialed scenarios is 
not limited by safety concerns while allowing minimum influence from outside factors. Due to the result of pre-
studies it is here assumed that the simulator affects the judgments of high and low expertise participant equally.
The study was performed in one of the static driving simulators of the Research and Innovation Center of the 
BMW Group in Munich, Germany. The visuals were delivered via an 8-channel projection creating a 210° frontal 
field of view as well as rear and side mirrors. The simulation was operated from the inside of BMW 5-series sedan 
converted into a simulator mockup. The setup of the vehicle and the frontal projection can be seen in Fig. 2.
Before the beginning of the test drive all participants were introduced to the aim of the study of exploring a 
specific method of controllability assessment. The participants were then introduced to the used measurement scales
and then seated in the simulator for a 15 minute introductory drive in the simulation. This introduction procedure 
was performed regardless of prior experience with the simulator and treatment condition.
The first design goal of the experiment is to analyze the effect of a manipulation of the understanding of the scale 
besides an aural description. For this purpose an interactive demonstration of two reference scenarios with different 
known criticalities was chosen to help participants relate the used scale to an actual example. Both scenarios were 
based on a section of highway road during manual driving without surrounding traffic. The critical situations 
contained a short-duration additive steering wheel torque, once in a low and once in a high torque manifestation. 
These two scenarios are well documented in literature (e.g.[15]) and had been validated in this specific simulator as 
well as real vehicles with coherent results on the criticality scale.
The calibration was implemented by presenting the low criticality version first and then asking the participant for 
his natural rating on the criticality of the situation. The participant was then informed about the results from earlier 
studies. Following this the high criticality situation was presented and rated by the participant. Again the earlier 
results were then revealed to the participant. Afterwards the participant was instructed to use these two scenarios as 
points of references for the judgment of the remaining situations.
To study the effect of this calibration procedure on low- and high-expertise participants an incomplete two-factor 
between design was chosen. The first factor was expertise, which wasn’t manipulated but fixed using different 
participant recruiting strategies. Low expertise participants were recruited from an existing naïve test subject pool. 
Mean age was 32.4 years between 18 and 65. The sample consisted of 84% males and the mean mileage was 15000 
km per year.High-expertise participants were recruited using a snowball-technique. The requirements for 
participation in the high-expertise group were based on the recommendations of the RESPONSE3 Code of Practice. 
Participants must have been named by others as experts on the ADAS under evaluation in human factors, safety 
systems or accident research and must have been involved in at least one earlier study of the controllability of an 
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ADAS. The second factor was calibration. To study the effect of the calibration procedure all participants were first 
subjected to the no-calibration condition. Then one low-expertise group (G1) was immediately treated to a repetition 
with no calibration. A second low-expertise group (G2) and the high-expertise group (G3) were first subjected to the 
calibration procedure and then interviewed on the tested scenarios again. This incomplete two-factor between design 
is visualized in table 1.
Table 1. Summary of the experiment design.
Expertise Before Calibration After
Low G1B No G1A
Low G2B Yes G2A
High G3B Yes G3A
Due to the limited availability of experts it was decided not to conduct a no-calibration group with the high-
expertise participants. This is because the study reported in [16]that was conducted with a very similar group of 
experts in the same simulator already measured the effect of expertise in the no-calibration condition. Instead all 
high-expertise participants were exposed to the calibration procedure to increase the likelihood of statistically 
significant results at the cost of less testable hypothesis.
At the most basic level it is expected that the demonstration of the calibration procedure will help to reduce the 
variance of the judgments of criticality (Cr) being cast by low- and high-expertise participants. The two connected 
hypothesis are H1 (1) and H2 (2).
H1: Var൫Cr(G2A)൯< Var൫Cr(G2B)൯
H2: Var൫Cr(G3A)൯< Var൫Cr(G3B)൯
(1)
(2)
To analyze the effect of the calibration treatment on the confidence of the participants in their own judgment a 
one-dimensional 5 point scale was used. One hypothesis is that the confidence (Co) judgments of the low-expertise 
group that had been subjected to the calibration method in the after condition will be lower than those of the group 
that merely experienced the repetition (3).
H3: Co(G1A)> Co(G2A) (3)
The next hypothesis is that the confidence judgments in the before condition are higher than in the after 
condition for those groups that experienced the calibration procedure. For the naïve participants this hypothesis 
leads to (4) and for the high-expertise participants to (5).
H4: Co(G2B)> Co(G2A)
H5: Co(G3B)> Co(G3A)
(4)
(5)
If overconfidence causes increased confidence ratings in the before condition then a low confidence in the after 
condition should be connected with a less extreme judgments of criticality as participants integrate the demonstrated 
scenarios into their own judgments. It is thus hypothesized that there is a positive correlation between the confidence 
expressed in each judgment and the absolute value of the difference between the connected judgment of criticality to 
the average criticality (Cr) in that condition for both treated groups. The connected hypotheses are given in (6) and 
(7).
H6: ȡ(Co(G2A), |Cr(G2A)-Crതതത(G2A)|)> 0 (6)
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H7: ȡ(Co(G3A), |Cr(G3A)-Crതതത(G3A)|)> 0 (7)
Finally the test-retest reliability of experts was to be explored. To that end two scenarios in this study were
chosen to be repetitions of scenarios examined earlier by the same set of experts in[16]. In that study judgments had 
also been cast on the same scale so that results can be compared. The time between both studies was approximately 
6 months and thus carryover effects are assumed to be insignificant. The introductory sequence of the earlier study 
was also identical.
The test in each condition consisted of a simulator drive of 7 scenarios with judgments of criticality and the 
associated confidence for each scenario. The comparatively large number of scenarios was chosen in order to 
increase the statistical power of the analysis. In each scenario the driver was assisted by an assistance system that 
consisted of ACC and a lateral control assistance that required constant supervision by the driver. In the definition of 
the SAE International this assistance system was thus a partially automated system (level 2)[18]. The critical 
scenarios encountered during the test drive can be seen in table 2. The specific scenarios were chosen based on their 
relevance to the controllability of the partial automated drive system.
Table 2. Description of the scenarios that were used in the study.
Number Description
1 Strong erroneous additive steering wheel torque to the right on rural road
2 Other vehicle cutting in moderately close from the right on highway
3 Moderate erroneous additive steering wheel torque to the right on rural road
4 Blocked road after a corner on rural road with bad visibility
5 Other vehicle cutting in very close from the right on highway
6 Blocked road after a corner on rural road with moderate visibility
7 Steering jerk on rural road
4. Results
This chapter will initially examine the hypothesis from the previous chapter and then explore the test-retest 
reliability.
Testing the judgments of criticality for normality resulted in a refusal of the hypothesis of normal distribution. 
Thus non-parametric tests were used in the analysis.Table 3shows the variances of the judgments for group G2
before and after calibration in each of the 7 scenarios and the results of a one-sided Levene test for the equality of 
variances at the 5% significance level.
Table 3. Measured variances for the group G2 before and after calibration.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Before 6,06 2,24 2,92 3,83 2,71 3,46 2,08
After 4,01 4,04 3,51 2,92 1,49 3,06 4,64
Levene test n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
These results indicate that in none of the seven scenarios a significant effect of the simple calibration method was 
achieved on the variance of judgments. Not even in the first scenario after the calibration procedure any significant 
effect can be measured. Hypothesis H1 is thus rejected.
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Table 4shows the variances of the judgments for high-expertise group before and after calibration in each of the 7 
scenarios and the results of a one-sided Levene test for the equality of variances at the 5% significance level. Again 
no significant results were identified and H2 is thus also rejected.
Table 4. Measured variances for the high-expertise participants before and after calibration.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Before 2,83 1,27 2,83 5,52 1,55 3,35 4,35
After 2,70 2,83 2,10 3,14 1,07 3,21 3,98
Levene test n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
The average confidence ratings for the tested conditions are presented in table 5. As expected the self assessed 
levels of confidence are lower in the conditions after calibration for low-expertise participants. No difference was 
observed for high-expertise participants. 
Table 5. Average confidence assessments for each condition.
Group Avg. confidence
Before After
G1 4.09 4.28
G2 4.16 3.97
G3 3.78 3.78
The hypothesis of normal distribution for the confidence data was rejected based on the results of a Lilliefors-
test. Thus a Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to verify the Hypothesis 3-5. The results are shown in table 6and 
support the assumption that the confidence is diminished by the demonstration of conflicting knowledge for low-
expertise participants. Contrary to expectation it was found that high-expertise participants had a significantly lower 
confidence in their judgments than the low-expertise participants in the before condition (p < 0.001).
Table 6. Results for the hypothesis 3-5.
Hypothesis p-value
H3: Co(G1A) > Co(G2A) < 0.001
H4: Co(G2B) > Co(G2A) < 0.05 
H5: Co(G3B) > Co(G3A) n.s.
Hypothesis 6 and 7 were tested using Spearman’s rank-correlation and resulted in the values given in table 7. 
This supports the hypothesis that increased confidence leads to more extreme judgments that are normalized through 
the experience of alternative information.
Table 7. Results for the hypothesis 6 and 7.
Hypothesis U p-value
ܪ6: ߩ(ܥ݋(ܩ2ܣ), |ܥݎ(ܩ2ܣ)െ ܥݎതതത(ܩ2ܣ)|) > 0 0.11 0.04
ܪ7: ߩ(ܥ݋(ܩ3ܣ), |ܥݎ(ܩ3ܣ)െ ܥݎതതത(ܩ3ܣ)|) > 0 0.19 0.04
13 of the high-expertise participants had previously participated in another study reported in [16]that contained 
the identical two steering wheel torque scenarios during partially automated driving on a rural road. In table 2 these 
scenarios were denoted as scenarios 1 and 3. Approximately 6 months had passed since the first study. Thus 
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carryover effects are assumed to not exist. Correlating the results from the previous study with those obtained in the 
G3B condition for the carried over scenarios yields a Spearman U of 0.42 at a p-value of 0.03.
5. Conclusions
This study explored some of the properties of expert reviews of controllability in a simulator environment. A 
manipulation of available information during the judgment procedure using an interactive demonstration of 
alternative opinion caused an adverse effect on the participant’s confidence in their own judgment. This effect was 
shown to be correlated with less extreme judgments after the treatment. This is an indication that expertise in the 
form of knowledge about the fallibility of their own judgment can potentially help guard against overconfident 
assessments of ADAS controllability.
Results from earlier studies were reinforced in that no significant effect of expertise on variance of judgments 
was identified. It is concluded that the used recruitment strategy for experts that was adapted from the RESPONSE3 
Code of Practice doesn’t automatically lead to more homogenous judgments than with naïve participants when 
judgments are elicited individually.
Test-retest reliability was also explored and identified at a low to medium value for the studied sample of experts. 
The fact that a liberal recruitment strategy resulted in a significant reliability gives hope that a more stringent 
sampling method for experts could lead to stronger results. It also indicates however that the recruitment strategy 
given in the RESPONSE3 Code of Practice doesn’t necessarily lead to infallible results.
References
[1] “Code of Practice for the Design and Evaluation of ADAS,” RESPONSE 3, 2009.
[2] R. Cooke and L. H. J. Goossens, “Procedures guide for structured expert judgement in accident consequence modelling,” Radiation Protection 
Dosimetry, vol. 90, no. 3, pp. 303–309, 2000.
[3] M. Burgman, F. Fidler, M. McBride, T. Walshe, and B. Wintle, “Eliciting Expert Judgments: Literature Review,” 2006.
[4] R. P. Harper and G. E. Cooper, “Handling Qualities and Pilot Evaluation,” Journal of Guidance, Control and Dynamics, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 515–
529, 1986.
[5] W. F. M. De Bondt, “What do economists know about the stock market?,” Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 84–91, 1991.
[6] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science, vol. 185, no. 4157, pp. 1124–1131, 1974.
[7] B. Englich, T. Mussweiler, and F. Strack, “Playing Dice With Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial 
Decision Making,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 188–200, 2006.
[8] B. Fischoff, “Debiasing,” Perceptronics PTR-1092-81-3, 1981.
[9] D. Griffin and A. Tversky, “The weighting of evidence and the determinants of confidence,” Cognitive psychology, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 411–
435, 1992.
[10] G. Klein, “Naturalistic Decision Making,” Human Factors, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 456–460, 2008.
[11] D. Kahneman, Thinking fast and slow: Macmillan, 2011.
[12] D. Kahneman and G. Klein, “Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree,” American Psychologist, vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 515–526, 
2009.
[13] K.A. Ericsson, Ed, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[14] A. Neukum, Lübbeke T, Krüger H. P, Mayser C, and Steinle J, “ACC-Stop&Go: Fahrerverhalten an funktionalen Systemgrenzen,” in 5. 
Workshop Fahrerassistenzsysteme, M. Maurer and C. Stiller, Eds, Karlsruhe, 2008, pp. 141–150.
[15] A. Neukum, E. Ufer, J. Paulig, and H.-P. Krüger, “Controllability of superposition steering system failures,” steering.tech, 2008.
[16] P. Galaske, M. Farid, and K. Bengler, “Influence of Expertise on the Judgment of Controllability of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems,” 
in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics AHFE 2014, 2014, pp. 2128–2135.
[17] P. A. Adams, M. Park, C. Adams, and J. K. Adams, “Confidence in the Recognition and Reproduction of Words Difficult to Spell,” The 
American Journal of Psychology, vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 544–552, 1960.
[18] Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems, J3016, 2014.
